Democracy VS Republicanism

Editors Note:

Many visitors of this blog have requested a post making distinction between a Classical Democracy and Republican form of government.

The following Piece is the courtesy of a great colleague of mine Mr. Youssouf Gabriel Bellamy, M.A.  describing  the Republican form government established in United States and its preference over direct form of Democracy for our Founding Fathers. I suspect that our international readers, in advance to the American, will find this post very informative and interesting.

Concerning the Proper Form of Government

…A Discussion on the forms of Democracy, and the most efficacious system in the eyes of the Framers

Today, some contend that the issue of adversarial partisanship epitomizes American government. Gridlock, resulting from conflicting notions surrounding concerns of the economy, healthcare, and overall direction for the general welfare of society has obstructed governmental efficiency. However, a much closer assessment of the system, and its current performance, indicates that although the Framers of the Constitution did not foresee the extremes of partisanship, or the development of political parties altogether, to their credit, they anticipated the occurrence of an overbearing majority in arising.  For this reason, the Framers and counterparts of the federalists supported a Republic (in which citizens ruled by entrusting representatives to govern on their behalf), as oppose to a Pure Democracy (in which citizens directly influenced the course of political decision making).  In favor of republicanism, the Framers (in the defense of liberty) advocated for the institutional components of checks and balances, bicameralism, and a separation of powers. These mechanisms the framer’s surmised, would thwart the ambitions of a probable overbearing majority (a plausible feature of pure democracy) and the threats that it could pose, not only to the system, but also to its citizens.

Subsequently, a brief discussion will outline the intent of the federalists and their advocacy for republicanism, highlighting salient Federalist Papers 10, 37,39, and 51, all of which justify the framer’s convictions as to the most efficacious form of government.

             Federalist papers 10, and 51 considerably, addresses how the Framers intended to preserve liberty within the republic, and the roles institutions would serve as mechanisms to protect such liberties, in a functioning representative democracy.  It was the probability of interests or groups in forming a faction, and potential majority that the founders perceived as baleful to the freedom of citizens. In summarizing this concern of the Framers, scholar Martin Diamond in Conservatives, Liberals, and the Constitution affirms,

“When a majority is included in a faction, it will be able “to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution”, because this is the necessary consequence of “the form of popular government”(Diamond, 1963, p. 81)”

To prohibit an overbearing majority from forming, Diamond argues, that Madison advocated for a multiplicity of factions, in a large extended commercial republic, in reference to the “theory of multiplicity, Madison affirms in Federalist 10,

“In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects, which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good ”(Diamond, 1963, p. 82)

To filter the passions of the extended republic and the multiplicity of interests, Madison also supported the notion of a representative democracy (Republic), as oppose to a participatory democracy (Pure democracy). Within a large commercial republic, Madison felt representatives of the legislature, as delegates, through their expertise guided by their sagacity, would be able to reflect the will of the people, in order to translate such needs into effective public policy. It is also for this reason, that the legislature was given constitutional supremacy, as its representatives, were viewed as the “voice of the people’. Federalist 51 is also of great significance because of its discussion of checks and balances and the need for a separation of powers. As representatives filtered the passions and interests of the broad electorate, the separation of powers (at both federal and state levels) ensured that each branch of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) could not amass unbridled power. If left unchecked, Madison felt such power would threaten the authority of each respective branch and essentially the functioning of government.  In light of this separation of powers James Madison famously asserted,

“If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions”(The Library of Congress).

  In observing administrations of the past, and well into the present day, the issue of gridlock has become more prevalent during times of divided government. The contemporary debates over the debt ceiling, ObamaCare and controversial issues that incite contention along partisan lines, have led some to question the perceptibility of the Framers and ultimately the notion of republicanism. However, proponents of republicanism maintain that although the Framers did not foresee, let alone predict the manifestation of adversarial partnership, their ingenious is accredited to their defense of the theoretical ideals of liberty and justice, and the institutional frameworks they created to preclude the emergence of an overbearing majority, which was analogous to tyranny.

                Proponents in line of this reasoning argue, that republicanism facilitates the possibility of compromise as each representative strives to satisfy the interests of those whom they represent.   Political parties today, incensed by differing ideals and further divided by their devotion to differing constituencies, are able if willing to capitulate for the sake of the people. Nonetheless, in addressing concerns of governmental inefficiency perhaps observations of a changed electorate, and the shifts of polarization overtime, are necessary to understand the current status of affairs, in a democratic republic, designed to reflect the will and interests of its people.

Youssouf Gabriel Bellamy, M.A.