Editors Note:
Many visitors of this blog have requested
a post making distinction between a Classical Democracy and Republican form of government.
The following
Piece is the courtesy of a great colleague of mine Mr. Youssouf Gabriel
Bellamy, M.A. describing the Republican form government established in
United States and its preference over direct form of Democracy for our Founding
Fathers. I suspect that our international readers, in advance to the American,
will find this post very informative and interesting.
Concerning
the Proper Form of Government
…A
Discussion on the forms of Democracy, and the most efficacious system in the
eyes of the Framers
Today,
some contend that the issue of adversarial partisanship epitomizes American
government. Gridlock, resulting from conflicting notions surrounding concerns
of the economy, healthcare, and overall direction for the general welfare of
society has obstructed governmental efficiency. However, a much closer
assessment of the system, and its current performance, indicates that although
the Framers of the Constitution did not foresee the extremes of partisanship,
or the development of political parties altogether, to their credit, they
anticipated the occurrence of an overbearing majority in arising. For
this reason, the Framers and counterparts of the federalists supported a
Republic (in which citizens ruled by entrusting representatives to govern on
their behalf), as oppose to a Pure Democracy (in which citizens directly
influenced the course of political decision making). In favor of
republicanism, the Framers (in the defense of liberty) advocated for the
institutional components of checks and balances, bicameralism, and a separation
of powers. These mechanisms the framer’s surmised, would thwart the ambitions
of a probable overbearing majority (a plausible feature of pure democracy) and
the threats that it could pose, not only to the system, but also to its
citizens.
Subsequently,
a brief discussion will outline the intent of the federalists and their
advocacy for republicanism, highlighting salient Federalist Papers 10,
37,39, and 51, all of which justify the framer’s convictions as to the most
efficacious form of government.
Federalist papers 10, and 51 considerably, addresses how the Framers intended
to preserve liberty within the republic, and the roles institutions would serve
as mechanisms to protect such liberties, in a functioning representative
democracy. It was the probability of interests or groups in forming a
faction, and potential majority that the founders perceived as baleful to the
freedom of citizens. In summarizing this concern of the Framers, scholar Martin
Diamond in Conservatives, Liberals, and the Constitution affirms,
“When
a majority is included in a faction, it will be able “to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution”, because this is the necessary
consequence of “the form of popular government”(Diamond, 1963, p. 81)”
To
prohibit an overbearing majority from forming, Diamond argues, that Madison
advocated for a multiplicity of factions, in a large extended commercial
republic, in reference to the “theory of multiplicity, Madison affirms in
Federalist 10,
“In
the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of
interests, parties and sects, which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of
the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good ”(Diamond, 1963, p. 82)
To
filter the passions of the extended republic and the multiplicity of interests,
Madison also supported the notion of a representative democracy (Republic), as
oppose to a participatory democracy (Pure democracy). Within a large commercial
republic, Madison felt representatives of the legislature, as delegates,
through their expertise guided by their sagacity, would be able to reflect the
will of the people, in order to translate such needs into effective public
policy. It is also for this reason, that the legislature was given
constitutional supremacy, as its representatives, were viewed as the “voice of
the people’. Federalist 51 is also of great significance because of its
discussion of checks and balances and the need for a separation of powers. As
representatives filtered the passions and interests of the broad electorate, the
separation of powers (at both federal and state levels) ensured that each
branch of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) could not amass
unbridled power. If left unchecked, Madison felt such power would threaten the
authority of each respective branch and essentially the functioning of
government. In light of this separation of powers James Madison famously
asserted,
“If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions”(The Library of Congress).
In observing administrations of the past, and well into the present day, the
issue of gridlock has become more prevalent during times of divided government.
The contemporary debates over the debt ceiling, ObamaCare and controversial
issues that incite contention along partisan lines, have led some to question
the perceptibility of the Framers and ultimately the notion of republicanism.
However, proponents of republicanism maintain that although the Framers did not
foresee, let alone predict the manifestation of adversarial partnership, their
ingenious is accredited to their defense of the theoretical ideals of liberty
and justice, and the institutional frameworks they created to preclude the
emergence of an overbearing majority, which was analogous to tyranny.
Proponents in line of this reasoning argue, that republicanism
facilitates the possibility of compromise as each representative strives to
satisfy the interests of those whom they represent. Political
parties today, incensed by differing ideals and further divided by their
devotion to differing constituencies, are able if willing to capitulate for the
sake of the people. Nonetheless, in addressing concerns of governmental
inefficiency perhaps observations of a changed electorate, and the shifts of
polarization overtime, are necessary to understand the current status of
affairs, in a democratic republic, designed to reflect the will and interests
of its people.
Youssouf Gabriel Bellamy, M.A.
Youssouf Gabriel Bellamy, M.A.